It may be that in an age when illnesses were generally thought to arise from the disequilibrium of the body's physiology, the notion of the disease as "enemy" was, in fact, so abstract and metaphorical that andreia seemed just a little too grounded in cotidian reality to serve as le mot juste for a physician's primary virtue. Bodies became ill, in other words, not so much because specifically identifiable "agents" attacked them, but because certain, sometimes nebulously construed, forces-nutrition, climate, selfneglect, and so on-altered their internal constitutions in destructive ways. It is useful in this regard to consider how powerfully microbiology has changed our own conceptions of disease. Ever since we could actually see the way "germs" can cause pathology, the notion of a "fight" against disease has become much less a metaphor than an accurate description of prevailing Western approaches to medicine.
3 But for the ancient doctor, the battle against disease may have been less "personalized" than it often is today, and this may explain why andreia, which could so readily conjure up vivid images of human combat, was felt to be less appropriate as a description of his particular battles. It is somewhat easier, after all, to anthropomorphize microbial entities as human enemies than the natural forces that loom so large in ancient etiologies of disease.
Despite the fact that the lexical term, andreia, was not explicitly used to describe the idiosyncratic virtues of the Hippocratic physician, however, we would like to argue in 3 For metaphors of warfare, invasion, victory and defeat in modern culture, see Sontag 1977, 62-66 . She speaks, for example, of "the American cancer establishment, tirelessly hailing the imminent victory over cancer; the professional pessimism of a large number of cancer specialists, talking like battle-weary officers mired down in an interminable colonial war…" this chapter both that they conceptualized their activity as a form of andreia, and that, in general, patients and the public at large expected from their doctors behavior which in other contexts would allow them to be considered andreioi. We propose to make this case by focusing on the Hippocratic discussions of a particularly troubling point of medical ethics, namely, how a doctor should behave in the face of obviously incurable patients.
Here, as we shall find, a classic dilemma arises when a profession ostensibly dedicated to healing disease and the relief of human suffering confronts a kind of battle it can never hope to win. As the treatises show, opinions were divided about the proper way to handle such cases, and rationality was not always their main criterion. Personal ego and the reputation of the profession itself were often at stake in this controversy, and questions of duty, honor and integrity evidently came into play on both sides. The treatises reveal, we believe, that the accusations and apologies on this issue fundamentally concerned what can only be regarded as the andreia of the physician: was the refusal to treat incurables a dereliction of duty? did it imply a form of cowardice, like that of the proverbial rhipsaspis, who tosses away his armor and flees a terrifying enemy? 4 Or, on the other hand, did such a physician justify his position by applying a more nuanced calculus of knowledge and reason to the notion of courageous behavior in medicine?
Even allowing for the substantive and chronological diversity of the Hippocratic corpus, it is reasonably clear that, as we will see in greater detail below, the "Hippocratic 4 Jouanna 1999, 110 , uses the term "noble flight" to describe how people might perceive a physician who refused to treat an incurable patient: "…a gesture so at variance with the heroic ideal, [that] the physician may seem to have fled from the battle against illness, throwing down his arms in the face of danger and uncertainty."
University of Pennsylvania Page 5 of 30 position" on this issue was that in some cases it was indeed best not to take on incurable cases. In responding to anonymous or hypothetical detractors, these treatises, once again, never invoke andreia as such, but the arguments they deploy bear a remarkable resemblance to the famous discussion of the term in Plato's Laches. In fact, all the interlocutors in the dialogue at one point or another invoke medicine (iatrikê) or physicians (iatroi) in their attempts to articulate a definition of andreia. Insofar as the dialogue ends aporetically, it is difficult to glean from it a definitive Platonic stance on whether physicians could or should possess andreia, but the discussion nevertheless clearly suggests that an association between andreia and iatrikê was commonly made, even if some people found it unconvincing. As we shall argue, the discussion in Laches not only clarifies the Hippocratic arguments defending their position on incurables, but also suggests that at the core of this defense lay the fundamental assumption that something akin to andreia ought to be seen as the primary virtue of the Hippocratic physician.
It is often noted that ancient medicine was a very "public" activity. Since the profession was unregulated and there were probably as many incompetent as competent physicians, the public was often understandably wary of a physician's claims to expertise.
Hence we continually hear of public debates between rival practitioners or schools, and both the Hippocratic treatises, and later, Galen, depict a climate in which physicians seemed constantly engaged in some form of debate, squabbling or even downright abuse.
It is no wonder that when they actually saw sick patients, they would doubtless have felt scrutinized by a wider public, 5 interested in assessing not only their skill at healing, but their demeanor and attitude along the way. Their metaphorical battle against disease was as much a spectacle as any real battle, and the physician's virtues as a soldier in this battle were every bit as public as those of a real soldier. 6 One can see, therefore, why a Hippocratic physician's decision to withhold treatment from certain cases would have been a matter of concern that extended far beyond his private dealings with the unfortunate patient. For just as the soldier who shirks his responsibilities on the battlefield is in danger of being branded anandreios (unless he can offer a persuasive explanation for behavior that on the surface will always appear reprehensible), so the physician, whose duty to heal the sick and relieve human suffering is professed time and again in the treatises with an almost heroic fervor, can easily give the appearance of repudiating his own principles of combat.
The rather cantankerous author of the treatise De Arte (Per‹ T°xnhw) was clearly reacting to such accusations from critics who regarded the Hippocratic refusal to treat incurables as evidence that medicine was a sham "art" to begin with. Indeed, this author regards his rhetorical mission as battle against ignorance, which seems to require as much courage and bravery as the battle against disease itself:
ı d¢ pare∆n lÒgow to›sin §w fihtrikØn oÏtvw §µporeuoµ°noiw §nanti≈setai, yrasunÒµenow µ¢n diå toÊtouw oÓw c°gei, eÈpor°vn d¢ 5 See Jouanna 1999, 75-80 for a discussion of the "public" aspects of Hippocratic medicine.
6 Battle metaphors for disease and treatment abound in the Hippocratic corpus. Cf. von diå tØn t°xnhn √ bohye›, dunãµenow d¢ diå sof€hn √ pepa€deutai. (1. [15] [16] [17] …but the treatise at hand will oppose those who attack medicine thus, emboldening itself through those it blames, well supplied by the art which it defends, and powerful in the knowledge in which it has been educated.
When the author offers a definition of medicine in the third chapter, it is striking that he includes a statement about incurable patients:
…tÚ dØ pãµpan épallãssein t«n noseÒntvn toÁw kaµãtouw, ka‹ t«n noshµãtvn tåw sfodrÒthtaw éµblÊnein, ka‹ tÚ µØ §gxeir°ein to›si kekrathµ°noisin ÍpÚ t«n noshµãtvn, efidÒtaw ˜ti taËta oÈ dÊnatai fihtrikAE. (3.5-8) [medicine is]…broadly speaking to relieve the sufferings of the sick, to mitigate the severity of diseases, and not to attempt to treat those who are overpowered by disease, knowing that medicine has no power over these cases. Our author does not deny the force of luck, but argues, as one might expect, that the technê of the physician demonstrably abets whatever fortune might hold for a patient (Chs. 5-7). Since most people, he argues, even those who never seek a doctor, would health in a variety of ways, you should choose the method that causes the least discomfort").
agree that some sort of intervention is called for in the face of a disease (changing a diet or climate, for example), 9 it is difficult to deny that a technê that rationalizes and systematizes such intervention would be even more useful to humanity than simply stumbling upon effective treatments haphazardly.
But one can see the trap that the author is unwittingly setting for himself with every step of his argument, and, ironically, we can anticipate the objection to a position advocating non-intervention in incurable cases. If the author, after all, has just finished arguing that one is generally better off not leaving the course of an illness up to chance and fortune, but rather should seek medical advice, why in the case of incurables, should one refuse to intervene, if only to alleviate suffering and (one might argue) make the body possibly more receptive to a chance recovery? The specific charge laid against the Hippocratic position, according to the author in Ch. 8, is that physicians limit themselves to cases which would "cure themselves" (aÈtå Íf' •aut«n ín §jugiãzoito), 10 while avoiding those where "there is a need of great assistance" ( §pikour€hw de›tai µegãlhw):
9 De Arte 5.9-11pollØ går énãgkh ka‹ toÁw µØ xrvµ°nouw fihtro›si, nosAEsantaw d¢ ka‹ Ígiasy°ntaw efid°nai, ˜ti µ dr«nt°w ti µ µØ dr«ntew Ígiãsyhsan: ["For there is no denying that even those who don't use doctors, but who recover from illness, realize that they have been cured because of something that they've done or not done."] 10 I take it that this really means something like this: "in cases where patients do recover, they would have recovered on their own, without the medical art" rather than that "physicians only take on cases which would otherwise cure themselves," since obviously physicians routinely treat patients who end up not being cured. The phrasing is elliptical efis‹ d° tinew o" ka‹ diå toÁw µØ §y°lontaw §gxeir°ein to›si kekrathµ°noisin ÍpÚ t«n noushµãtvn 11 µ°µfontai tØn fihtrikØn, l°gontew …w taËta µ¢n ka‹ aÈtå Íf' •aut«n ín §jugiãzoito, ì §gxeir°ousin fi∞syai, ì d' §pikour€hw de›tai µegãlhw, oÈx ëptontai, de›n d¢, e ‡per ∑n ≤ t°xnh, pãny' ıµo€vw fi∞syai.
And there are some who also blame medicine because of those who are unwilling to take on patients who have been defeated by their disease; they say that the cases which they attempt to cure are those which which would be cured on their own anyway, but that they don't touch the cases where there is need of great assistance. But (they say), if medicine is in fact an art, then it ought to cure all cases alike.
The detractors maintain that if medicine were really a technê, it would at least attempt to cure all patients, 12 not just the "easy" cases which would be cured anyway. This objection
here, but seems to assume that the physician will prognosticate about the patient's 12 I understand there to be an ellipse of §gxeir°ousin with the second fi∞syai. What they want is for a physician to take on any sick patient, regardless of the chances of recovery; they certainly would not assume that a physician would successfully cure every patient.
In point of fact, there is plenty of evidence outside of this treatise that Hippocratic physicians did treat hopeless cases, and it seems clear that the matter was one of perennial debate. For discussion and references, see Wittern 1979 , von Staden 1987 n.1, 102-12, Jouanna 1999, 109-11; see also van der Eijk 1999. seems simple enough, but it has several revealing implications. First, it clearly assumes a normative model of medicine: if one is going to make the claim that medicine is a technê, then one will assume that a technê will behave according to certain protocols, that there are certain things it should do if it can legitimately be considered a technê. So if one claims that the technê of medicine is to do one thing (e.g., minister to the sick), you cannot then claim that it also does not do that very thing (e.g., when it says it will not treat the incurably sick). In other words, the refusal to treat incurables is here essentially portrayed by the detractors as a repudiation of the stated principles of the technê of medicine. Thus, the physician who takes such a position is put in a terrible bind, for he is exposed as either an unethical hypocrite or a simple charlatan who conspires with his colleagues to take on only those cases which will make their empty profession look good.
It is clear that the author of De Arte deeply resented the implication that the refusal to treat incurables constituted an ethical breach, and he spends the rest of Chapter 8 attempting to explain the position. 13 The core of his explanation lies in an appeal to the
proper knowledge of what medicine is and is not capable of doing, and the rational application of this knowledge. Simply put, he says in so many words that medicine has no business trying to fight a battle it cannot hope to win; and it is the technê itself which provides the knowledge necessary to determine when this might be the case:
tan oÔn ti pãy˙ ênyrvpow kakÚn ˘ kr°sson §st‹ t«n §n fihtrikª Ùrgãnvn, oÈd¢ prosdokçsyai toËtÒ pou de› ÍpÚ fihtri k∞w krathy∞nai ên:
So whenever a person suffers from something bad which is stronger than the tools available to medicine, then one can hardly expect that it can be defeated by medicine.
This leads him to conclude that some cases are simply "inappropriate" for the physician to take on, because he has no means strong enough to defeat the disease:
ofl µ¢n oÔn µeµfÒµenoi toÁw to›si kekrathµ°noisi µØ §gxeir°ontaw parakeleÊontai ka‹ oen µØ prosAEkei ëptesyai oÈd¢n ∏sson µ oen prosAEkei: parakeleuÒµenoi d¢ taËta, ÍpÚ µ¢n t«n oÈnÒµati fihtr«n yauµãzontai, ÍpÚ d¢ t«n ka‹ t°xn˙ katagel«ntai.
Those who blame physicians who don't take on incurable cases, urge them to treat inappropriate cases no less than appropriate ones. In urging this, they may be admired by people who call themselves physicians, but they are ridiculed by "real" physicians [lit.: phyicians versed in technê].
Behind this curious statement about "inappropriate" and "appropriate" cases, it seems, lies a contemporary clash between people who expect from their physicians an engaged compassion for the sick patient regardless of the illness, and physicians whose cool, rational attitude towards the nature of illness allows them to keep their distance from patients they deem incurable. This author, in fact, turns the tables and practically accuses any physician who takes on a desperate case of charlatanism ("physicians in name only").
Yet, from the second sentence quoted above, many people admired such a physician and presumably found his behavior ethically correct, if not plainly heroic. The author of De Arte stands his ground, however, maintaining that praise or blame emanating from such people is "foolish" (aphrones), and that the real physician should heed only those who have "rationally calculated at what point the activities of craftsmen become finally complete" (lelogisµ°nvn prÚw ˜ ti afl §rgas€ai t«n dhµiourg«n teleut≈µenai plAEreiw efis‹). The author's disdain for the opinions of anyone but an initiated professional, indeed for any unphilosophized position on a medical subject, is palpable. It is easy to see from this little vignette that the Hippocratic physician who refused certain cases as a matter of principle might run counter to popular notions of medical ethics, and risked appearing not only arrogant, but also cowardly.
This controversy, then, between Hippocratic professionals and certain unspecified antagonists ultimately rests on two opposing ways of conceptualizing medicine as a form of combat. On the one hand, some (presumably non-Hippocratic) physicians, considered "foolish" by our author, plunge headlong into the battle against disease, indiscriminately taking on all cases, and evidently reaping great renown for it (yauµãzontai). Patients may die, and these physicians may well expect such an outcome from the start, but people admired the fact alone that they would take on even the most desperate cases, 14 just as in other contexts the same people might admire a soldier whose andreia emboldened him against even the most insurmountable enemy. 15 To the Hippocratic 14 On the "public", performative aspects of ancient medicine, see Jouanna 1999, 75-76. 15 Galen notes that in his time some physicians (whom he regards as disingenuous- courage from his own more rigorous conception, which requires the application of knowledge: "And so the things that you and the many call 'courageous,' I call 'bold', whereas the acts performed with intelligence are the ones I call 'courageous.'" (taËt'
oÔn ì sÁ kale›w éndre›a ka‹ ofl pollo€, §g∆ yras°a kal«, éndre›a d¢ tå frÒniµa per‹ oen l°gv.) desperate patients. We can see, therefore, why the Hippocratic author of the treatise might feel rather defensive, since if the ethic of "remaining at one's post and not fleeing" was commonly transferred to the realm of medicine, those who did not do so, even for principled reasons, could easily be branded cowards.
In Laches, however, as in De Arte, the prudence of such unreflective engagement with an enemy is questioned. Socrates asks Laches at 193a3 to consider which of two men he would consider the more andreios:
SV. éll' §n pol°µƒ karteroËnta êndra ka‹ §y°lonta µãxesyai, fron€µvw logizÒµenon, efidÒta µ¢n ˜ti bohyAEsousin êlloi aÈt", prÚw §lãttouw d¢ ka‹ faulot°rouw µaxe›tai µ µey' oen aÈtÒw §stin, ¶ti d¢ xvr€a ¶xei kre€ttv, toËton tÚn µetå t∞w toiaÊthw fronAEsevw ka‹ paraskeu∞w karteroËnta éndreiÒteron ín fa€hw µ tÚn §n t" §nant€ƒ stratop°dƒ §y°lonta Ípoµ°nein te ka‹ kartere›n;
Well, suppose a man endures in battle, and his willingness to fight is based on wise calculation because he knows that others are coming to his aid, and that he will be fighting men who are fewer than those on his side, and inferior to them, and in addition his position is stronger: would you say that this man, with his kind of wisdom and preparation, endures more courageously or a man in the opposite camp who is willing to remain and hold out? [tr. Sprague] Laches' first response is that the man in the "opposite camp" is the more brave; he is not given time to expatiate, but he doubtless reflects the attitude of most of his contemporaries. The first man might be admirable in his own way, but his endurance is safer and more predictable, and, Laches might say, it is less easy to describe him as "courageous," at least according to common usage, than the weaker opponent who holds out against him even to the point of his own defeat. Socrates, however, presses his point with similar examples, and Laches must agree with him at 193c9 that "people like this take risks and endure more foolishly than those who do it with techne" (ka‹ µAEn pou éfronest°rvw ge...ofl toioËtoi kinduneÊous€n te ka‹ karteroËsin µ ofl µetå t°xnhw aÈtÚ prãttontew) And since they had earlier agreed (192d) that "foolish daring and endurance is both shameful and injurious" (. De Arte are working to refine popular conceptions of "courageous" behavior by 17 The closing paragraph of de Arte reiterates the connection between the knowledge that comes with a technê and proper ethical behavior-in this case, the refusal to treat very problematic cases: ˜ti µ¢n oÔn ka‹ lÒgouw §n •vutª eÈpÒrouw §w tåw §pikour€aw ¶xei ≤ fihtrikØ, ka‹ oÈk eÈdiory≈toisi dika€vw oÈk ín §gxeir°oi tªsi noÊsoisin, µ §gxeireuµ°naw énaµartAEtouw ín par°xoi, o· te nËn legÒµenoi lÒgoi dhloËsin a· te t«n efidÒtvn tØn t°xnhn §pide€jiew... ["that medicine is well stocked with rational arguments in itself to come to its aid, and that it would justly not attempt to treat illnesses which are difficult to cure, or would make those who did take them on error-free, both the discussions of this treatise, and the demonstrations of those who understand the craft, make clear."] emphasizing the importance of knowledge and rationality for evaluating the outcome of our actions.
The argument in Laches proceeds even further, as Nicias takes over as Socrates'
interlocutor and presses the notion, which he attributes ultimately to Socrates (194d) 18 At 199c-e, it becomes clear that the argument has led them to conclude that courage implies all the virtues and a knowledge of all goods and evils, even though they had previously agreed that it was only a part of virtue. At that point, the argument is dropped and the dialogue draws to a close.
The two agree that they would not consider doctors to be "courageous," although ti o ‡etai toÁw fiatroÁw pl°on ti efid°nai per‹ toÁw kãµnontaw µ tÚ ÍgieinÚn ~efipe›n oÂÒn te ka‹ nos«dew. ofl d¢ dAEpou tosoËton µÒnon ‡sasin: efi d¢ deinÒn tƒ toËtÒ §stin tÚ Ígia€nein µçllon µ tÚ kãµnein, ≤gª sÁ tout€, OE Lãxhw, toÁw fiatroÁw §p€stasyai; µ oÈ pollo›w o ‡ei §k t∞w nÒsou êµeinon e‰nai µØ énast∞nai µ énast∞nai; toËto går efip°: sÁ pçsi f∫w êµeinon e‰nai z∞n ka‹ oÈ pollo›w kre›tton teynãnai; (195c7-d2).
[Laches says what's not true…] Because he supposes that physicians know something more about the sick than how to say what is healthy and what is sick.But surely that's all they really know; and if recovery for a patient is more terrible than being sick, do you think, Laches, that doctors know this? Or do you not suppose that for many people it's better not to recover from an illness than to recover? I mean, tell me this: do you say that it's better in all cases for patients to live, and that it's not better for many of them to die?
Behind this line of questioning lies a debate about what sort of knowledge one could expect from a physician, and Nicias implies that popular opinion would not expect much.
It is indeed curious that he asks Laches specifically about a doctor's ability to decide whether all patients are necessarily worth treating or not, and they end up agreeing that this is beyond his normal purview. The physician's job, according to this formulation, is
only to articulate what is or is not illness, although he essentially implies that an "ideal" physician (who would be able to discern what is truly "fearful" [deina] and "to be dared"
[tharralea]) would be able to prognosticate more accurately about a given disease, and decide whether treatment was even indicated. Nicias does not seem especially hopeful that physicians-or any craftsman, for that matter-would ever display this skill, but several times in the discussion, they assume that it is hypothetically possible. At 195d7, for example, Nicias claims that a physician cannot really distinguish whether a patient is better off dead, and what things would be fearful to which sort of patient, "except the one who knows the difference between what is and is not fearful, whom I call courageous" (plØn t" t«n dein«n ka‹ µØ dein«n §pistAEµoni, ˘n §g∆ éndre›on kal«). And later, at 196d4, Socrates notes that few would be able to possess Nicias' criterion for courage (knowledge of the fearful and what should be dared): "neither the physician nor the seer will understand this, and won't be courageous, unless he can actually apply this knowledge ( §ån µØ aÈtØn taÊthn tØn §pistAEµhn proslãb˙). The possibility, in other words, that physicians might in fact possess a genuinely informed technê about the prognosis of diseases and the appropriateness of treatment (or non-treatment) is clearly entertained, even if these interlocutors might be hard pressed to think of any good examples. Nevertheless, we may remember that such a physician, however hypothetical in their minds, would, according to Nicias' definition, possess true andreia.
Socrates, for his part, fundamentally endorses Nicias' notion of andreia, but adds that the courageous man will have knowledge of past and present deina and tharralea as well as of future ones. Again, medicine serves as an illustrative example: oÂon per‹ tÚ ÍgieinÚn efiw ëpantaw toÁw xrÒnouw oÈk êllh tiw µ fiatrikAE, µ€a oÔsa, §forò ka‹ gignÒµena ka‹ gegonÒta ka‹ genhsÒµena ˜p˙ genAEsetai:
For example, when it comes to health, there is no art other than medicine directed at all periods of time, which, though a single art, surveys present, past and future, how things will happen.
He proceeds with a similar argument for farming and generalship, concluding that in all such cases andreia consists in the knowledge of past, present and future goods and evils idiosyncratic to each field. In part, this argument is intended to echo Nicias' earlier assertion at 196a2 that the seer's art, despite its ability to describe fearful or hopeful future events, is not necessarily courageous, since the seer need not comment on whether such events are beneficial to a person. At the same time, however, Socrates wants to retain the notion that andreia does imply at least some prognosticatory skill-one needs a full and genuine understanding of how events will turn out in order to act prudently and courageously.
19 Without this, one's behavior is little more than some form of recklessness or madness. But they especially died inasmuch as they were around it the most." (oÎte går fiatro‹ ≥rkoun tÚ pr«ton yerapeÊontew égno€&, éll' aÈto‹ µãlista ¶yn˙skon ˜sƒ ka‹ µãlista prosªsan, oÎte êllh ényrvpe€a t°xnh oÈdeµ€a.) The implication seems to be that it was essentially ignorance that killed these poor doctors, and that if they had understood the real power of the plague, they would (and should) have acted differently. This was no real courage, but lack of experience and insight, much as
Socrates holds in Laches. See Horstmanshoff 1989 , 1992 and 1993 . them rash and mad…My view is that very few have a share of courage and foresight, but that a great many, men and women and children and wild animals, partake in boldness and audacity and rashness and lack of foresight. These cases, which you and the man in the street call courageous, I call rash, whereas the courageous ones are the sensible people I was talking about." [Tr. Sprague] . See also the similar discussion in Plato Prt.
349b-51b, and Protagoras' conclusion, 351a5-b3: oÏtv d¢ kéke› oÈ taÈtÚn e‰nai yãrsow te ka‹ éndre€an: Àste suµba€nei toÁw µ¢n éndre€ouw yarral°ouw e‰nai, µØ µ°ntoi toÊw ge yarral°ouw éndre€ouw pãntaw: yãrsow µ¢n går ka‹ épÚ t°xnhw g€gnetai ényr≈poiw ka‹ épÚ yuµoË ge ka‹ épÚ µan€aw, Àsper ≤ dÊnaµiw, éndre€a d¢ épÚ fÊsevw ka‹ eÈtrof€aw t«n cux«n g€gnetai.
tÚn fihtrÚn dok°ei µoi êriston e‰nai prÒnoian §pithdeÊein: progign≈skvn går ka‹ prol°gvn parå to›si nos°ousi tã te pareÒnta ka‹ tå progegonÒta ka‹ tå µ°llonta ¶sesyai, ıkÒsa te parale€pousin ofl ésyen°ontew §kdihgeÊµenow, pisteÊoit' ín µçllon gign≈skein tå t«n noseÒntvn prAEgµata, Àste tolµçn §pitr°pein toÁw ényr≈pouw sf°aw •vutoÁw t" fihtr". tØn d¢ yerape€hn êrista ín poi°oito, proeid∆w tå §sÒµena §k t«n pareÒntvn payhµãtvn. Ígi°aw µ¢n går poi°ein ëpantaw toÁw ésyen°ontaw édÊnaton: toËto går toË progign≈skein tå µ°llonta épobAEsesyai kr°sson ín ∑n: §peidØ d¢ ofl ênyrvpoi époynAEskousin, ofl µ¢n pr‹n µ kal°sai tÚn fihtrÚn, ÍpÚ t∞w fisxÊow t∞w noÊsou, ofl d¢ ka‹ §skalesãµenoi paraxr∞µa §teleÊthsan, ofl µ¢n ≤µ°rhn µ€hn zAEsantew, ofl d¢ Ùl€gƒ pl°ona xrÒnon, pr‹n µ tÚn fihtrÚn tª t°xn˙ prÚw ßkaston noÊshµa éntagvn€sasyai: gn«nai oÔn xrØ t«n pay°vn t«n toiout°vn tåw fÊsiaw, ıkÒson Íp¢r tØn dÊnaµ€n efisi t«n svµãtvn, [ëµa d¢ ka‹ e ‡ ti ye›on ¶nestin §n tªsi noÊsoisi,] ka‹ tout°ou tØn prÒnoian §kµanyãnein. oÏtv går ín yauµãzoitÒ te dika€vw, ka‹ fihtrÚw égayÚw ín e ‡h: ka‹ går oÓw oÂÒn te perig€gnesyai, toÊtouw ¶ti µçllon dÊnait' ín Ùry«w diafulãssein, §k ple€onow xrÒnou probouleuÒµenow prÚw ßkasta, ka‹ toÁw époyanouµ°nouw te ka‹ svyhsoµ°nouw progign≈skvn ka‹ proagoreÊvn éna€tiow ín e ‡h. (Prognostic 1.1) I hold that it is an excellent thing for a physician to practice forecasting. For if he discover and declare unaided by the side of his patients the present, the past and the future, and fill in the gaps in the account given by the sick, he will be the more believed to understand the cases, so that men will confidently entrust themselves to him for treatment. Furthermore, he will carry out the treatment best if he know beforehand from the present symptoms what will take place later. Now to restore every patient to health is impossible. To do so indeed would have been better even than forecasting the future. But as a matter of fact men do die, some owing to the severity of the disease before they summon the physician, others expiring immediately after calling him in-living one day or a little longer-before the physician by his art can combat each disease. It is necessary, therefore, to learn the nature of such diseases, how much they exceed the strength of men's bodies, and to learn how to forecast them. For in this way you will justly win respect and be an able physician. For the longer time you plan to meet each emergency the greater your power to save those who have a chance of recovery, while you will be blameless if you learn and declare beforehand those who will die and those who will get better. (Tr. Jones)
The emphasis on the physician's knowledge of "past, present and future" in the first sentence is strikingly reminiscent of the description of medical prognosis in Laches, as is the importance given to an intellectual understanding of the entire course of a disease.
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Further, both passages hold that the best physicians will display the best skills in prognosis; proper technical knowledge, in short, is the sine qua non of an ethically appropriate medical practice. Once again, this passage shows just how "public" medicine was: the physician is fighting a battle (µ tÚn fihtrÚn tª t°xn˙ prÚw ßkaston noÊshµa éntagvn€sasyai) and all eyes are watching his performance. He aims to be admired for his skills, but he wants this admiration to be won with integrity. As the author states, if a physician can prognosticate well, he will be "justly admired" (...ín yauµãzoitÒ te dika€vw) and will be shown to be a "good doctor" (fihtrÚw égayÚw ín e ‡h). In Prognostic, the problem of incurables is likewise at issue, except in a more positive, and slightly more oblique, way. The author's point in the final sentence of the quoted passage is that proper prognosis will allow the physician to treat his patients more effectively and to "declare beforehand those who will die and those who will get better"
(toÁw époyanouµ°nouw te ka‹ svyhsoµ°nouw progign≈skvn ka‹ proagoreÊvn), and, most significantly, that if he demonstrates good prognostic skills, he will be held blameless (éna€tiow ín e ‡h) for his judgments about recovery and nonrecovery. Behind this statement lie clear traces of the contemporary debate about incurable patients, for we can assume that when the author speaks of a physician forecasting a patient's death (toÁw époyanouµ°nouw), he is also thinking of that physician's refusal to take on such a case. Someone at some time was evidently always "blaming" physicians for their stance on whom to treat, but, the author claims, if one can show genuine skill in prognostics, the refusal to treat certain patients is not only rationally defensible but morally justified. those physicians who unreflectively took on all cases regardless of their prospects for recovery, and those who refused incurable patients was fundamentally a debate between two conceptions of heroism, each with its own criteria for andreia. The one we might characterize as the traditional and popular version, which valued daring and endurance regardless of the chances of victory (and sometimes all the more in direct proportion to decreasing odds for survival!). The other examined a given situation in which such qualities as daring and endurance might be called for, assessed the risks, and considered what the benefits of "courageous" action were likely to be. The criterion in these cases was reason and knowledge, rather than reflexive emotion or a penchant for martyrdom, but the result looked quite different from what one commonly considered andreia.
Indeed, although it may seem rather alien to us, the Hippocratic insistence on a rational
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